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Abstract 
This paper argues that in the current data-rich environment, organizations need formal policies for 
privacy as a way to avoid “privacy disasters”. Privacy disasters can occur when a company uses 
consumer data in a way that is legal, but violates public norms for acceptable use. The paper uses a 
case study to illustrate the elements that often characterize privacy disasters, and describes the 
principles and processes that can serve as the basis of a privacy policy capable of helping 
organizations avoid these negative events. The paper also highlights the implications of big data for 
privacy policy. 
Keywords: Privacy, Data Governance, Policy. 
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1 Introduction 
Today, data are an important asset because new and 
existing devices, platforms, and sensors generate data 
at an exponential rate. To remain competitive in this 
environment, DalleMule and Davenport (2017) argue 
firms need a coherent data strategy that makes 
appropriate trade-offs between offense and defense. 
Offense involves supporting business objectives using 
tools such as predictive analytics, while defense 
involves minimizing risks related to data use. In the 
same way, organizations have risk policies for financial 
and other valuable assets, defense requires that they 
also have policies to govern the risks associated with 
data use, including privacy (Markus, 2000). 
Companies suffer privacy disasters when they use 
consumer data in ways that are legal and believed to 
provide business advantage, but are perceived by the 
public as violating expectations for acceptable use. 
Privacy disasters can result in negative publicity, 
 
reputational damage, loss of consumer trust, and 
possible legal action. The purpose of this paper is to 
argue the importance of having a formal privacy 
policy as a means to manage risks related to data use 
and avoid privacy disasters. 
Within information systems (IS) and elsewhere, 
privacy is often equated with data security. Here, the 
focus is on data use. Security is about protecting 
personal data, while privacy is broader and 
encompasses permissions and acceptable use of data 
as well as protecting data from unauthorized access. 
Privacy cannot exist without security. However, 
organizations can successfully secure personal data in 
their custody and still make bad decisions about how 
they use the data. 
While published accounts of privacy disasters may all 
seem to differ from one another because they involve 
different business models, different technologies, or 
different uses of information, this paper will argue 
that despite this perception, privacy disasters share 
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common elements. A comprehensive privacy policy 
that includes both systems development and data use 
can be the basis for end-to-end governance programs 
needed to avoid privacy disasters. To illustrate this 
point, we now turn to a historical example: Lotus 
Marketplace: Households. Some might wonder why 
we use such an old example. The case illustrates that 
privacy disasters reflect a management failure 
independent of technology, and calls into question why 
so many organizations still leave themselves exposed. 
 
2 The Case of Lotus Marketplace: 
Households1 
In 1990, Lotus Development announced a new 
application for Apple computers: Lotus Marketplace: 
Households. Marketplace turned out to be a 
spectacular early example of a privacy disaster. While 
it occurred before the Web and today’s social media, 
it nonetheless had some of the hallmarks of many 
current privacy disasters and, as a result, provides 
lessons that are still relevant today, independent of  
the particular technology involved. The elements of 
the case included: 
 A large company. Lotus Development was a 
large, prominent technology company. 
Founded in 1982, it developed and marketed 
business software and CD ROM databases. Its 
first product, Lotus 123, was a widely-adopted 
spreadsheet application. Lotus was purchased 
by IBM in 1995. 
 A new technology platform. Here, the platform 
was the CD-ROM. Lotus was interested in 
being a first-mover for developing CD-ROM 
applications. 
 A controversial application involving personal 
information. Marketplace was a mailing list for 
business-to-consumer marketing. The rationale 
for the product was to help small businesses 
use direct marketing to target prospective 
customers by using the database to identify 
prospects who met certain criteria.2 
 A data broker. Data brokers or information 
resellers are businesses that acquire personal 
information about consumers from a variety of 
sources and sell that information to other 
organizations. Here, the data broker was 
Equifax, one of the three largest credit bureaus, 
which supplied the names and addresses as 
 
1 For the full case, see Culnan and Smith (1995). 
2 There was also a version of Marketplace: Business for 
B2B marketing, but since it did not contain personal 
information on consumers, it did not raise any privacy 
issues. Here all references to Marketplace are to the 
consumer version. 
well as other data that could be used for targeting 
from its Consumer Marketing Database. The 
names and addresses in this database originated 
from the individual’s credit report. 
 “Social Media” to mobilize the public about 
the incident. In the early 1990s, this consisted 
of Internet mailing lists and discussion groups. 
Here, the RISKS Digest, a moderated forum 
published since 1985 by the ACM, was the 
basis for disseminating news and provided a 
platform for organizing opposition to 
Marketplace for the technology community. 
Lotus Marketplace was announced in a direct 
marketing trade publication based on a Lotus press 
release. The article stated that Marketplace was 
designed for small businesses, a market underserved 
by the mailing list industry. As a result, Marketplace 
was expected to have a major impact on the current list 
industry. At the time, companies rented lists of prospects 
from list brokers who controlled access to the lists they 
managed. Subsequent use of a list was managed by 
seeding where the broker added “fake” names to the list 
so it could monitor whether or not use complied with the 
terms of the list rental. With Marketplace, control over 
the data was in the hands of the end user. Updated CD- 
ROMs were issued quarterly. 
Several steps were taken to protect the data in 
Marketplace from misuse. The data on the CD-ROM 
were encrypted and compressed so the record for a 
particular individual could not be accessed; only 
names and addresses could be printed or accessed by 
the user. Marketplace could be ordered from retailers 
who sold computer software; however, it was not 
available for purchase by individuals, only  
businesses. Consumers could have their names 
removed from the database by writing Equifax or 
Lotus, or calling a toll-free number. Further, 
Marketplace users were expected to comply with the 
Direct Marketing Association’s voluntary ethical 
guidelines. Equifax was aware of potential privacy 
issues with Marketplace. They did a privacy audit and 
conducted consumer focus groups. 
The privacy disaster began to unfold in fall 1990. A 
privacy advocacy organization hosted a demo of 
Marketplace and invited a Wall Street Journal 
reporter to attend. The reporter subsequently 
published an article with the headline: “Lotus Product 
Spurs Fears about Privacy” (Wilkie, 1990). 
Subsequently, the Wall Street Journal article and 
comments were posted on the RISKS Digest and these 
were widely recirculated on other networks. 3 In 
addition, an individual distributed the email address 
for Lotus CEO Jim Manzi, resulting in a flood of 
 
3 See: RISKS Digest, 10(61), 1990. Available at http:// 
catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/10/61#subj2. 
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emails from angry Lotus customers. Approximately 
30,000 people asked to opt out of the database. In the 
midst of the controversy, Equifax identified two key 
issues that needed to be addressed: (1) Was 
Marketplace a proper use of credit report data? and 
(2) How could an inexpensive opt out be developed? 
With mainframe-based mailing lists, opt-outs could 
be processed in real time. With a CD ROM, there was 
no way to remove a name from a prior version of 
Marketplace once the CD was in the hands of a user. 
Finally, in January 1991, prior to actual the release of 
the product, Lotus and Equifax made a joint decision to 
cancel Marketplace: Households. Two factors were 
cited in the decision. First, they could not ignore the 
volume, tenor, or response from consumers, Lotus 
customers, or other important groups. Second, they 
could not address the substantial, unexpected additional 
costs necessary to address the privacy concerns. 
 
3 Policy Can Help Avoid Privacy 
Disasters 
Policy is a system of principles used to guide 
decisions toward desired outcomes in a wide range of 
settings. Policy differs from rules or law in that policy 
merely guides actions toward managerial or 
administrative mechanisms that can achieve particular 
goals (King & Kraemer, 2019). Privacy policy has 
two basic elements. First, organizations need 
principles to govern their information practices. 
Second, they need a process to ensure compliance 
with the principles as operationalized. 
The principles of a privacy policy should reflect fair 
information practices (FIPs). FIPs are global norms 
that make personal information use fair for 
individuals and, if followed, minimize the risk to 
organizations of collecting and using personal data 
(Bruening & Culnan, 2016). The FIPs are based on 
principles which are both timeless and technology 
neutral. Since the 1970s, FIPs have served as  the 
basis for privacy laws and self-regulatory programs 
around the world. At the heart of the FIPs is the 
principle of transparency, meaning there should be no 
secret systems. In the US, transparency has been 
primarily operationalized by posting a privacy notice. 
The AICPAs generally accepted privacy principles 
(GAPP) represents a current version of the FIPs.4 The 
GAPP consist of ten principles: 
 
 
 
4 See https://www.cippguide.org/20100701/generally- 
accepted-privacy-principles-gapp/. “Notice” is the first 
principle of the original FIPs. In the GAPP, “management” 
 
 Notice: The organization provides notices of 
the purposes for which personal information is 
collected, used and retained. 
 Choice and consent: The organization 
describes the choices available to  the 
individual related to how their personal 
information is used and disclosed. The 
organization obtains implicit or explicit 
consent regard to collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal information. 
 Collection: Personal information is only 
collected for the purposes identified in the 
notice. 
 Use, retention and disposal: Use of personal 
information is limited to the purposes 
described in the notice and is retained only for 
as long as needed to fulfill the purpose, or as 
required by law. 
 Access: The organization provides individuals 
with access to their personal information for 
review or update. 
 Disclosure to third parties: Personal 
information is disclosed to third parties only 
for the identified purposes and with the  
implicit or explicit consent of the individual. 
 Security for privacy: Personal information is 
protected against unauthorized access. 
 Quality: Personal information that is necessary 
for the purposes identified is maintained as 
complete, accurate and relevant. 
 Management: the organization defines, 
documents, communicates and assigns 
accountability for its privacy policies and 
procedures. 
 Monitoring and enforcement: The organization 
monitors compliance with its privacy policies 
and procedures and has procedures in place to 
address privacy-related complaints and 
disputes. 
The process component of the privacy policy is 
needed to ensure that the organization implements 
and complies with the policy and can demonstrate its 
compliance. Currently, there is an emerging 
consensus that the process should be a risk- 
management program based on accountability 
principles. The specifics should reflect the data the 
organization collects, its business model, and the risks 
its data practices pose for individuals. There are nine 
accountability principles5: 
is the first principle but for the purposes of this discussion,    
“notice” is discussed first as part of the policy rules while 
“management” is discussed as part of the policy process. 5   See  http://informationaccountability.org/wp-content /uploads/CIPL_Accountability_Phase_II_Paris_Projec 
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 Policies: Binding and enforceable written data 
privacy policies and procedures that reflect 
applicable laws, regulations, and industry 
standards. 
 Executive oversight: Oversight and 
responsibility for data privacy and protection. 
 Staffing and delegation: Resource allocation to 
ensure the organization’s privacy program is 
appropriately staffed by adequately trained 
personnel. 
 Education and awareness: Existence of 
ongoing, up-to-date programs to keep 
employees and relevant business partners 
aware of privacy obligations. 
 Ongoing risk assessment and mitigation: 
Implementation of a process to assist the 
organization in understanding the privacy risks 
raised by new products, services, technologies, 
and business models, and to mitigate those 
risks. This principle is often operationalized by 
a cross-functional committee. The committee 
needs to include software developers to insure 
that privacy is built into new systems from the 
beginning. 
 Privacy program risk assessment oversight and 
validation: Periodic review of the totality of 
the accountability program to determine 
whether modification is necessary. 
 Event management and complaint handling: 
Procedures for responding to inquiries, 
complaints and privacy breaches. 
 Internal enforcement: Internal enforcement of 
the organization’s policies and discipline for 
non-compliance. 
 Redress: The method by which an organization 
provides remedies for those whose privacy has 
been put at risk. 
Having a privacy program that defines principles and 
formal processes for responsible data governance can 
help organizations avoid privacy disasters such as 
Lotus Marketplace. At the time of the case, however, 
such privacy programs were largely nonexistent. 
Further, Lotus Marketplace violated two fundamental 
privacy principles, notice, and choice, allowing its 
lessons to be generalized despite the age of the case. 
People were surprised to learn that information from 
 
 
 
t-2.pdf. There is some overlap between the GAPP and the 
accountability principles, as some of the GAPP specify 
process requirements. 
 
their credit report was going to be used for marketing 
by a third party. The ability to provide meaningful 
advance notice was challenged by the fact that 
consumers did not have a direct relationship with 
either Equifax or Lotus, unlike other firms which 
market directly to consumers. While the two 
companies technically offered choice by allowing 
people to opt out of the product, real choice was made 
infeasible by the lack of notice and the fact it was 
difficult to remove names from an existing CD-ROM. 
In the early 1990s, Smith (1993) conducted a 
landmark case study of how seven large companies 
handled sensitive personal information. He 
characterized what he learned as a cycle of 
“wandering in the maze”; unofficial information 
practices drifted until the organization perceived 
some type of external threat, such as legislative 
scrutiny or negative publicity, resulting in some type 
of a formal organizational reaction to the threat. 
Where explicit policies existed, there was often a 
mismatch between these policies and the 
organization’s actual practices. Further, executive 
neglect signaled to employees that privacy was not a 
strategic corporate issue as senior executives rarely 
sought information about the policy implications of 
new uses of information. 
Approximately fifteen years later, Bamberger and 
Mulligan (2011) noted that corporate privacy 
management in the United States was undergoing a 
significant change from Smith’s findings as firms 
created chief privacy officer (CPO) positions with 
responsibility for privacy governance. They 
interviewed nine CPOs at large organizations who 
had been identified as leaders in the privacy field by 
their peers. In addition to developing policies to 
ensure organizational compliance with privacy laws 
around the world, all nine firms based their 
privacy policy on consumer expectations, even if 
these expectations exceeded what was required by 
law. Essentially privacy was equated with 
consumer trust and this led to operationalizing 
privacy within the firms as risk management 
rather than pure legal compliance. The importance 
of this approach to  successful  privacy 
management will be discussed subsequently. 
 
4 Two Contemporary Privacy 
Disasters 
Today, the outcry over a CD-ROM database seems 
quaint. We now fast forward to two contemporary 
privacy disasters which while involving current 
technologies, reflect similar failures of corporate 
decision-making related to strategic uses of new 
technologies as Marketplace. In the first case, the 
New York Times published an article in 2012 
describing how Target used big data analytics (a new 
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technology) of customer purchase data to build a 
“pregnancy prediction model” which identified 
female shoppers who were most likely to be pregnant 
(a controversial application based on personal data). 
Target subsequently mailed coupons for baby items to 
the customers identified by the model. One of the 
mailings went to a teenager, resulting in an angry 
phone call to Target from her father who didn’t 
know she was pregnant. In subsequent testing, 
Target quickly learned that while the mailings were 
legal, they were perceived as creepy by many 
people because the company knew about their 
pregnancies in advance, thus violating social norms 
about being “spied on” (Duhigg, 2012; Hill, 2012). 
Years later, “Target” is still used as shorthand in 
discussions about privacy issues raised by the use  
of predictive analytics to draw inferences about 
individuals from big data. 
In another example, Mattel canceled plans to 
introduce a smart device called Aristotle. Aristotle 
was targeted for children from infancy to adolescence 
(a vulnerable population). It was a voice-activated 
Wi-Fi device with a companion camera and e- 
commerce functionality based on Amazon’s Alexa (a 
new technology) and was designed as a “first-of-its- 
kind connect kids room platform” (a controversial 
application). The product was criticized by child 
advocacy groups, parents, and lawmakers based on 
concerns about profiling and the negative impact an 
AI device could on have on a child’s privacy and 
development. Following a leadership change and a 
product review, Mattel decided that Aristotle did not 
“fully align with Mattel’s new technology strategy”. 
It is interesting to note that Mattel had been 
previously criticized for its Wi-Fi Interactive Hello 
Barbie in 2015 (Peachman, 2017). 
 
5 New Challenges of Big Data 
Big data presents two major challenges for privacy 
policy. First, there can be significant challenges for 
organizations to provide meaningful notice to 
consumers. Without notice, consumers are likely to  
be surprised about a particular use of their data, as 
was the case with Marketplace. Today, complex 
technologies, new business models and data practices, 
IoT devices without screens, as well as digital 
services such as big data analytics and behavioral 
advertising that are difficult to explain provide 
additional challenges. Even if, at a given moment, it 
were feasible to provide a notice that could 
reasonably describe a company’s information 
practices, rapid changes in technology, analytics, and 
business relationships could quickly render the notice 
inaccurate (Bruening & Culnan, 2016). 
Further, data analytics, by definition, are applied to 
data originally collected for a different purpose and 
often combined with data from other sources. The 
individual may be aware of the initial collection and 
uses of data, but not of the subsequent analytic 
processing. Data scientists may use large data sets for 
exploratory analysis, meaning data are used in ways 
that could not have been anticipated and would not 
have been described in a privacy notice. Analytics 
may also be used to create new personal data from 
nonpersonal data—illustrated, for example, by the 
inferences drawn from the customer purchase data used 
to infer pregnancy in the Target example (Sax 2016). 
Providing effective notice to consumers when these 
new uses actually occur is not practical. As a result, 
organizations need to craft and implement processes to 
help them successfully navigate current and future 
privacy risks posed by big data and predictive 
analytics, as well as other new technology applications. 
Second, companies often fail to understand the 
importance of contextual norms for acceptable use of 
personal information. These norms reflect 
expectations for what information practices are 
acceptable in a particular context at a given point in 
time and, as a result, do not raise privacy concerns in 
that context. One hallmark of uses that violate 
contextual norms is that they may often be viewed as 
“creepy”—for example, unexpected data sharing with 
third parties or new technology features, both of 
which may violate current expectations and norms for 
acceptable data practices. Problems are less likely to 
occur when a technology operates in a way people 
expect, or when people provide data for a particular 
purpose that they understand and their data are used 
in a way that is consistent with that purpose. 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the old model 
of “notice and choice”—in which the firm posts a 
notice of its information practices and it is left to the 
individual to decide whether or not to participate with 
the firm—is broken. As a result, consumers are 
currently vulnerable in their dealings with 
organizations because they suffer from significant 
deficits of information and control about how their 
personal information is collected and used that did not 
exist previously. Given the current limits of notice 
described previously, these deficits make it 
impossible for people to be fully informed about an 
organization’s information practices. Similarly, 
consumers have few opportunities to exercise control 
over the ways their personal data are reused once 
information practices have been disclosed (Culnan & 
Williams, 2009). As a result, people depend on 
companies to act in their best interest and do no harm. 
One way for organizations to do this is to broaden the 
scope of their formal risk assessment and mitigation 
reviews beyond privacy compliance to include ethics. 
The prior examples in the paper were all legal, but 
subsequent reviews by the organizations suggested they 
should  not  have been undertaken.  Some have proposed 
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that ethical reviews might be modeled after existing 
reviews for human subject research (Calo, 2013). 
Privacy governance also must include software 
development. Reviews to ensure that  new 
applications both comply with a firm’s privacy rules 
and respect consumer expectations need to be 
conducted before systems are developed and 
throughout the development process and should 
include the people building the applications. 6 The 
assumptions underlying the algorithms that perform 
automated decisions and have the potential to result in 
illegal discrimination or errors also need to be 
reviewed. In a recent study, Waldman (2018) 
investigated how designers of technology products 
think about privacy and integrate privacy into their 
work. He found that for some in his sample, designers 
were not part of the privacy governance processes 
being managed by the CPOs in their organizations, 
with the result that privacy barely factored into design. 
He concluded that this might explain why so many 
products seem to ignore our privacy expectations. 
 
6 Implications for IS Research 
Privacy is now a mainstream business issue. The 
International Association of Privacy Professionals 
(IAPP) now has 50,000 members. Organizations 
continue to be challenged to avoid privacy disasters 
resulting from missteps involving new technologies 
and new sources of data. New regulations such as the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or 
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) impose 
comprehensive requirements on organizations for  
data use and data governance. In the US, there is 
heightened congressional interest in privacy, fueled in 
part by publicized incidents involving some of the 
large platforms. The time is right for IS researchers to 
take an interest in privacy policy. 
Within the IS field, the privacy issues related to data 
use have received little attention compared to other 
privacy issues (Smith, Dinev, & Xu 2011). Given the 
importance of data to organizations today, there is 
both a tremendous need and opportunity to conduct 
impactful research that can help understand and 
potentially influence both public and organizational 
privacy policy. Such research can focus on a wide 
range of interesting questions. For example, what 
should public policy related to data use look like and 
what are the possible unintended consequences of 
new regulation to organizations? Within 
organizations, privacy policy can be viewed through 
the lens of existing theories related to  
implementation. How should different types of 
organizations operationalize privacy principles in 
their policies? How does privacy policy function “on 
the ground” in organizations? What are successful 
models for ethical review panels? For those interested 
in research that focuses on consumers, research is 
needed on how individuals react to particular 
elements of an organization’s privacy policy and how 
this is related to implementation. For example, Xu, 
Dinev, Smith, & Hart (2011) studied the link between 
organizational privacy assurances such as privacy 
notices and individual responses to the notice and 
found preliminary evidence that respectful practices 
can instill perceptions of confidence and fairness. 
While conducting research within organizations 
presents challenges such as gaining access, content 
analysis of privacy disasters based on press accounts or 
summaries of FTC enforcement actions is one way to 
provide interesting and useful insights about outcomes 
related to the implementation of privacy policy.7 
Finally, there is also a need to address privacy in IS 
curricula so our students will be well prepared to 
address the data issues they encounter over the course 
of their careers. While a detailed discussion of 
curriculum is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
skills needed include privacy engineering for systems 
development and data ethics for data science. For 
example, the 2016 Joint ACM/AIS MSIS Model 
Curriculum states that the protection of privacy and 
integrity should guide all IS practices, including 
requirements to analyze the privacy implications of 
key IS decisions, and should incorporate technical 
safeguards to protect individual privacy as part of IS 
design and implementation.8 
 
7 Conclusion 
A recent IDC study predicted that by 2025, 75% of 
the world’s population will interact with data every 
day and that each connected person will have at least 
one data interaction every eighteen seconds (Reinsel, 
Gantz & Rydning, 2018). In addition to current data 
sources such as online activity, mobile apps, data 
brokers and other third parties, new sources of 
consumer data will include the Internet of things 
(IoT) and other smart devices, connected cars, voice 
input, and sensors, among others. 
It is highly unlikely that consumers will understand 
fully the new forms of data these devices collect, with 
whom the data are shared, and how the data are 
 
 
 
 6 Privacy engineering is one way to help ensure privacy is 
built into new applications. It is an emerging discipline 
which seeks to provide methodologies, tools and techniques 
to ensure that software applications provide acceptable 
levels of privacy. See Brooks et al. (2017) and Dennedy, 
Fox & Finneran (2014). 
7 See Culnan (2011) for an example of how to use FTC 
enforcement actions to assess accountability. 
8See MSIS 2016, Global Competency Model for Graduate 
Degree Programs in Information Systems, May 23, 2017, 
retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1145/3127597. 
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subsequently used. It will also take time for shared 
norms to evolve about which new practices are 
appropriate, suggesting that in this data-rich 
environment, privacy disasters will continue to pose a 
risk for organizations. Having a comprehensive privacy 
policy focusing on respect for customer expectations is 
one way organizations can avoid privacy disasters and 
capitalize on the opportunities provided by the new 
sources of data and new analytic tools. Privacy policy 
is an area ripe for interesting and important research. 
Hopefully, the IS field will rise to this challenge. 
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